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SOBERING UP AND GOING GLOBAL:
BRAZIL'S PROGRESS FROM POPULISM
AND PROTECTIONISM
Peter Kingstone*
VER the course of the last two decades, Brazil has made an impres-
sive progression in terms of its economic policy and performance.
By the early 1980s, the "Brazilian Miracle" was decisively over, and
the "country of tomorrow" was reeling from a cluster of severe economic
problems, including rising inflation, deepening balance of payments
problems, sluggish growth, and crippling external debt. In 1985, the com-
bination of economic problems contributed to the end of the military re-
gime that had overseen the "miracle years." The miracle was premised
on strong state-leadership and import-substitution-industrialization (ISI),
but by the end of the dictatorship, it was clear that this basic formula had
to change. Unfortunately, the new democracy also struggled initially to
develop a coherent approach to solving the country's deepening eco-
nomic problems. The election of Fernando Collor in 1990 did finally
usher in a new direction as Collor embraced neoliberal economic re-
forms, especially privatization and trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the
transition was anything but smooth or consensual, and the resulting polit-
ical turbulence did little to resolve the economic crisis. In fact, Brazil's
political and policy performance was so erratic that the Economist maga-
zine observed that the county's problems were the result of it being
"drunk, not sick."'
As of 2008, the situation has changed dramatically. Brazilian economic
and social policy is widely praised for its stability, innovativeness, and
adherence to prudent macroeconomic principles. And though Brazil's
economic performance continues to lag behind the region's leaders, it is
dramatically improved relative to its own past performance, with the
trend pointing towards continued improvement. It is important to note
that this dramatic change occurred under the government of Workers'
Party President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. The one-time socialist labor
leader has eschewed populist or more radical leftist policies and instead
has championed a reformist, moderate-left strategy premised on
macroeconomic stability. Thus, Brazilian democracy has "sobered up"
* Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut
1. Jim Rohwer, The Blessed and the Cursed; The Only Thing Standing Between Brazil
and Asia-like Rates of Economic Growth Is Lousy Government. Jim Rohwer Asks
Whether It Will Kindly Get Out of the Way, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1991 at 3.
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from its early confused and confusing start at managing the economy.
Indeed, a wide consensus exists across the political system on the need for
less state management and more sensible, non-inflationary
macroeconomic policies.2
The need to contain inflation was probably the most important cause of
the shift in the approach to economic policy, but the approach to trade
policy has also experienced a significant philosophical shift within Brazil-
ian policy circles. Historically, since the onset of the Great Depression,
Brazil had been a closed country, as evidenced by its annual trade
amounting to (roughly) only 6 to 8 percent of GDP. The country's indus-
trial sectors were heavily protected through both tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers, while agricultural competitiveness was systematically undervalued
and undermined. By contrast, Brazilian trade in 2007 accounted for
roughly 25 percent of GDP, and import tariffs had fallen to an average of
14 percent from an average of 112 percent during the 1980s.3 In addition,
a liberalized agriculture sector has boomed, leading to large increases in
exports of products such as soy and meat. The dramatic increase in Bra-
zilian trade reflects a newfound belief in its value as a critical element of
the country's growth strategy. Thus, the Brazil of 2007, with its commit-
ment to macroeconomic stability and openness to trade, was dramatically
different from the Brazil of twenty years ago.
The question this paper addresses is: how and why did this shift hap-
pen? I argue that the most important element driving this process of
change was the concern over inflation. The need to reduce inflation and
keep it low fueled a process of political learning, on both the right and the
left, about the value of sound macroeconomic policy and the important
role that trade plays in the macroeconomic policy. Macroeconomic sta-
bility is not the only factor that accounts for Brazilian attitudes toward
trade. For example, Brazilian policy makers, especially those within the
powerful foreign ministry (Itamaraty), have long viewed Brazil as a re-
gional power, with these views continuing to be important. 4 Further-
more, the protectionist and statist beliefs summed up by the word
"desenvolvimentista" (developmentalist) are still present among Brazilian
policy makers and business elites. Macroeconomic concerns remain para-
mount, however, and basic policy decisions-from social policy to foreign
policy-tend to be subordinate to macroeconomic priorities. The empha-
sis on the macro economy helps to account for both the degree of open-
ness of the Brazilian economy as well as the limits of the willingness to
2. Timothy J. Power, Centering Democracy? Ideological Cleavages and Convergence
in the Brazilian Political Class, in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL REVISITED (Peter King-
stone & Timothy J. Power eds., forthcoming Oct. 2008.
3. Ministdrio de Desenvolvimento, Indistria, e Comdrcio Exterior, http://www.mdic.
gov.br (last visited Mar. 2008).
4. See Maria Regina Soares de Lima & Monica Hirst, Brazil as an Intermediate State
and Regional Power: Action, Choice, and Responsibilities, 82 INT'L AFF. 1, 21-40
(2006).
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make further concessions in the interests of greater integration. 5
I make this case in five sections. As background for understanding the
shift, Section I examines Brazil's strategy for economic growth at the time
of the transition to democracy. This section also examines the new de-
mocracy's initial efforts to both address Brazil's economic crisis and con-
sider alternative development strategies. Section II examines the initial
shift in orientation towards neoliberal reforms, including trade liberaliza-
tion, and discusses the "drunkenness" of the political process at the time.
Section III discusses the "sobering up" phase of Brazilian politics-when
political consensus on macroeconomic policy began to emerge and the
country's neoliberal model began to consolidate. Section IV discusses the
current administration of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the consolidation
of the country's growth strategy into a pragmatic version of neoliberal
reforms. This section explores Brazil's increasing openness to trade and
its importance to the economy, as well as the sources of continued reser-
vations about deepening trade integration, particularly through the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas. Finally, the concluding section, Sec-
tion V, discusses the implications of Brazil's stance towards continued
trade integration and the sources of concern regarding the sustainability
of Brazil's growth strategy.
I. CLOSED AND DRUNK: SLOUCHING
TOWARDS INTEGRATION
In the early 1980s Brazil was in difficult straits. The military regime
that had led the country out of economic chaos in the 1960s and into the
"miracle years" of 1967-1974 had lost the credibility to govern. The mili-
tary had tried to cope with the oil shock of 1973 by borrowing heavily and
growing the economy out of its difficulties. With the second oil shock of
1979 and a debt crisis emerging in 1982, the military regime was out of
answers. The hopes of Brazilian grandeza (greatness), built upon dy-
namic state leadership and a powerhouse industrial economy, were be-
yond the capacity of the military's economic team. Their failures helped
contribute to a loss of political support even amongst the regime's most
important civilian supporters in the business and financial communities. 6
By 1983, the military had fallen back on orthodox economic measures to
contain inflation and restore some measure of order to Brazil's external
accounts. Other than this, the military had neither the vision nor the po-
litical support to implement a new economic strategy.
Some state technocrats in the National Development Bank (BNDES),
however, began to formulate a proposal for economic reform after con-
5. See Andrd Averbug, Brazilian Development Bank, Brazilian Trade Liberalization
and Integration in the 1990s (1999), http://www.bndes.gov.br/english/studies/trade.
pdf.
6. Luis CARLOS BRESSER-PEREIRA, 0 COLAPSO DE UM ALIANIA DE CLASSES
(Editora Brasiliense 1978); JEFFRY FRIEDEN, DEBT, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOC-
RACY: MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LATIN AMERICA, 1965-1985 (Princeton
University Press 1991).
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sidering Brazil's need to shift its growth strategy. 7 The concern among
these BNDES economists was that the Brazilian economy was falling be-
hind the rest of the world technologically. In their view, the economy was
divided between competitive and modern sectors on the one hand and
backwards and uncompetitive sectors on the other. The competitive and
modern sectors were losing ground in the global economy because of the
state's disorder and the resulting loss of investment capacity. The uncom-
petitive sectors, while not aware of their backwardness, were important
because this group's noncompetitiveness was a drag on economic growth.
The solution, in the economists' view, was to turn away from import-sub-
stitution-industrialization and instead seek greater integration with the
global economy-but on Brazil's terms. The strategic objective of this
"competitive integration" was to close the gap between the modern and
backwards sectors and increase the overall competitiveness of the Brazil-
ian economy.8 Thus, competitive integration envisioned selective trade
liberalization as an element within a larger set of industrial policies. The
government of Jos6 Sarney (PMDB, 1985-1989) announced a new indus-
trial policy in 1988 that incorporated the competitive integration philoso-
phy, including selective, limited liberalization, within its proposals,
though ultimately, this incorporation amounted to little.
Unfortunately, no strategy was capable of producing results in the ab-
sence of macroeconomic stability, and the New Republic that emerged
out of the transition from the dictatorship appeared at the onset to be
even less capable of governing the economy than the military. From 1985
to 1989, the economy suffered terribly. Inflation rose from roughly 600
percent in 1985 to over 80 percent per month by the inauguration of Pres-
ident Fernando Collor in March of 1990. On virtually every economic
indicator, Brazil was suffering from bad performance or high levels of
volatility, or both. Brazilian policy makers appeared incapable of chang-
ing course.9
The source of the policy makers' difficulties was primarily political.
Brazilian politics in the New Republic created several distinct challenges.
First, the restoration of democratic rule opened the door to new demands
from groups neglected or suppressed under the military. In turn, these
newly mobilized groups offered tempting targets for populist appeals. In
particular, Sarney manipulated his first and most important stabilization
effort, the Cruzado Plan, for partisan political gain at the expense of the
7. The BNDES was the state's principal arm of development financing and promo-
tion and an important center of technocratic capacity.
8. BANCO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO E SOCIAL, INTEGRAIAO
COMPETITIVA: UMA ESTRAT8GIA PARA o DESENVOLVIMENTO BRASILEIRO (Nov.
1989); Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas, Chief of the Planning Dept., Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e Social, Integraqco Competitiva: Uma Nova Es-
trat6gia para a Industrializaqho Brasileira, Paper Presented at the United Nations
Industrical Development Organization Technical Meeting (1989).
9. See WERNER BAER, THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Praeger 1995).
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coherence and effectiveness of the plan.10 Short-term positive results
translated into success in the 1987 mid-term elections for the PMDB. In-
flation, however, returned with renewed energy almost immediately af-
terwards. Sarney's government introduced multiple stabilization plans
from 1988 until the end of his term in office, but all of them failed, due at
least in part to a lack of political ability to make hard choices."
Sarney's problem lay in the character of the political system as it
emerged from the dictatorship. The party system began to fragment al-
most immediately after the transition, growing from a handful of parties
(mainly the Social Democratic Party (PDS), the Party of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (PMDB), and The Workers' Party (PT)) to nearly
twenty parties with legislative representation. In addition, party and elec-
toral system rules weakened party discipline and intensified the incentive
to cultivate personal votes, especially within the lower chamber. 12 To-
gether, the fragmentation and personalization weakened presidential au-
thority vis-a-vis the Congress and increased the need for patronage
spending. As re-establishing macroeconomic stability depended, at least
in part, on reining in expenditures, Sarney's efforts to solve inflation were
not supported in the legislature.
Finally, in addition to Sarney's populist efforts and the political sys-
tem's tendency toward fiscal indiscipline, the new constitution badly exac-
erbated the situation. The new constitution was written from 1987
through 1988, and the leftist and nationalist groups that mobilized more
effectively in the early rounds of draft writing influenced its character.
As a consequence, the constitution contained articles detailing extensive
social and labor rights, limiting interest rates, and closing off important
segments of the economy to foreign investment. Furthermore, the docu-
ment reflected the desire of its drafters to undo the centralizing character
of the dictatorship. Perhaps the most important result of this desire was
that the constitution mandated the transfer of revenues to states and mu-
nicipalities without requiring related spending obligations by the revenue
recipients. Thus, the new constitution enshrined nationalist and statist
economic principles while creating a kind of perverse fiscal federalism
that profoundly compromised the fiscal health of the state.13 Sarney's
failure to advance any kind of meaningful reform of economic policy is
perhaps not much of a surprise in hindsight. Successful reform would
have to await a new president.
10. Lourdes Sola, Heterodox Shock in Brazil: Tgcnicos, Politicians, and Democracy, 23
J. OF LATIN AM. STUD. 163, 163-95 (1988).
11. Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil, 33 J. IN-
TERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., 1, 1-21 (1991).
12. SCOTT MAINWARING, RETHINKING PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WAVE OF DE-
MOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF BRAZIL (Stanford University Press 1999).
13. Alfred Montero, Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization and the New
Brazilian Federalism, in Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes (Pe-
ter Kingstone & Timothy J. Power eds., University of Pittsburgh Press 2000).
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II. OPENING UP... BUT STILL DRUNK
The 1989 presidential elections offered two contrasting choices of the
future direction of Brazil. On one hand, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a one-
time labor leader and a founder of the Worker's Party (PT), offered a
program based on nationalism and socialism. Lula articulated intense
distrust of the United States, multinational corporations, and large firms
in general. His competitor was Fernando Collor (PRN), the son of an
elite northeastern family who ran on a populist-style platform that was
short on specific proposals and long on symbolism and rhetoric designed
to mobilize the resentment of the poor. Though short on specifics, Collor
did clearly signal two priorities. First, he promised to kill inflation with a
single bullet. Second, he vowed to modernize Brazil-to turn it into a
sleek, efficient "Brazil incorporated." Thus, the 1989 election featured an
explicit choice between nationalism and socialism on the one hand and
neoliberalism on the other. From an elite (notably business) perspective,
neither candidate was desirable.1 4 Socialism was certainly not an option,
but neoliberalism was a long way from "competitive integration."
Collor won the election, decisively beating Lula among the poorest and
least educated voters and losing to him in every other category. Collor
had won the votes of the poor based on his pledges to combat inflation
and his dramatic neopopulist attitudes towards elites. One observer
opined that Collor had won by running against elites, but now he would
have to govern with them.1 5 But Collor's desire to advance a neoliberal
agenda was not very popular among elites. The combination of a very
small base in Congress (due to the fragmentation of the system) and an
economic agenda that ran counter to many elite interests (on both ne-
oliberalism and containing inflation) made Collor's situation perilous.
What Collor did have on his side was a high level of popular approval,
especially as he began his assault on inflation. Collor's solution to infla-
tion was a drastic plan designed to dramatically curtail inflation with a
single blow. It was a plan that reflected the difficulties Brazilian presi-
dents faced in crafting enduring, programmatic legislative coalitions. The
Collor Plan was launched shortly after his inauguration in March 1990,
after declaring a bank holiday. The government then announced sharp
restrictions on bank withdrawals, effectively freezing roughly 80 percent
of the country's money supply. The plan had several elements in its
favor. It had an immediate effect on inflation while its burden-unlike
most stabilization plans-fell disproportionately on wealthier citizens
(those with more in the bank). The reduction in inflation added to Col-
lor's popular approval, which he wielded like a weapon against the recal-
14. PETER KINGSTONE, CRAFTING COALITIONS FOR REFORM: BUSINESS PREFER-
ENCES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND NEOLIBERAL REFORM IN BRAZIL (Penn-
sylvania State University Press 1999).
15. Id.
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citrant congress. 16 With his popular approval, Collor pushed a neoliberal
reform agenda through a quiescent and timid congress. This included
privatization plans, wide-ranging deregulation, cuts in government spend-
ing, and the implementation of a gradual, ordered, and thorough trade
liberalization plan.
Trade liberalization was an important part of the modernization of the
economy, but falling protection also had important anti-inflationary ef-
fects by reducing domestic producers' freedom to pass on rising costs to
consumers. Average tariffs began a scheduled four-year reduction pro-
gram, with tariffs on basic inputs and capital goods falling first and fastest
while the most heavily protected consumer goods sectors, such as auto-
mobiles, had additional time to make competitive adjustments in antici-
pation of increased import competition. Tariffs for capital goods and
equipment that were not produced locally were reduced to 0 percent im-
mediately. In addition, the Collor administration sought to eliminate
non-tariff barriers, ease import and export regulations, and ended the
market reserve for computers.1 7 In short, Collor pursued a significant,
unilateral trade liberalization that included a reasonable adjustment
timeframe for domestic producers. In this respect, the program was dis-
tinctly different from some of the more notable, drastic Latin American
trade liberalizations, such as the ones that occurred in Chile and Argen-
tina in the 1970s.
Industrialists in previously protected sectors had mixed views of the
Collor Plan. On the one hand, many of them recognized that the Brazil-
ian economy had to open up and that the scheduled tariff reduction pro-
cess was reasonable. The government encouraged and supported
business associations and sindicatos (syndicates, for the sake of uniform-
ity) to become more involved in the dissemination of information about
new methods of quality production and identification of trade partners.
On the other hand, many of these same industrialists observed that trade
liberalization without the accompanying macroeconomic stability and
without complementary policies that depended on a fiscally healthy state
(such as infrastructure investment and deeper capital markets) was sim-
ply a recipe for de-industrialization. Industrialists protested vigorously
for things like reform of Brazil's notoriously inefficient and burdensome
cascading taxes on production (as well as income and payroll taxes). In
short, industrialists' support was contingent on Collor's efforts to improve
the state's fiscal health.18 Unfortunately, Collor made little headway on
this last front.
Collor was aware of the need to address the root causes of Brazil's
fiscal mess (and, ultimately, inflation). Solving these larger issues meant
16. Kurt Weyland, The Brazilian State in the New Democracy, 39:4 J. OF INTERAM.
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 63, 63-94 (Winter 1997-1998).
17. GESNER OLIVEIRA, CONDICIONANTES E DIRETRIZES DE POLTICA PARA A ABER-
TURA COMERCIAL BRASILEIRA (IPEA Research Project, CEBRAP, Sao Paulo,
Brazil 1991).
18. See KINGSTONE, supra note14.
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addressing constitutional sources of fiscal imbalance as well as attacking
the elite interests-in the congress and in state and local governments-
that protected the ongoing fiscal crisis. But, to do that, Collor needed to
forge a stable legislative coalition out of a highly fragmented and per-
sonalistic legislature. By late 1990, it was clear that Collor's single bullet
to kill inflation had missed, and inflation, driven by the deep structural
problems he was hoping to address, was resurgent. 19 With inflation re-
turning, Collor's strategy of reform "by imposition" on the Congress was
no longer viable. 20 Instead, the Congress turned on the increasingly un-
popular Collor and derailed his policy program. By early 1992, Collor's
legislative agenda was finished.
Although Collor's administration ended in legislative failure (and then
scandal, corruption, and impeachment in 1992), he had successfully
changed the direction of Brazil's economy and its growth strategy.
Though Brazil's policymaking elite had not become ideological neoliber-
als, there was much wider acceptance of the need to enhance the compet-
itiveness of the local economy by opening to trade. Even Lula began
campaigning in the mid 1990s on "competitive integration" as opposed to
old-ISI style, nationalist state-led growth.
The new orientation to trade was cemented in the negotiation of
Mercosur, the agreement that established a free trade zone among Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay under the Treaty of Asuncion in
1991. Mercosur was an ambitious project that envisioned the zone's
eventual development into a customs union and then common market.21
It envisioned a political strategy of mutual defense of democracy and the
creation of a strong institutional framework. The first, and easiest, steps
were not to take place until 1994; however, in the meantime, Brazil re-
mained plagued by intolerably high levels of inflation and considerable
fiscal disorder.
III. GETTING SOBER, CLOSING TRADE
Between December 1992, when Collor was impeached on corruption
charges, and January 1995, Itamar Franco, Collor's Vice President, gov-
erned the country. Franco was not sympathetic to the neoliberal direc-
tion and did little to advance Collor's agenda. He did nothing to reverse
it, however. In fact, Franco's only notable achievement as president was
to appoint Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) as Finance Min-
ister, who in turn put in place the plan that definitively tamed inflation in
Brazil: the Real Plan.
Cardoso's success was built on learning from successive failures at sta-
bilization under both Sarney and Collor. Virtually all the early efforts
19. Ben Ross Schneider, Brazil Under Collor: Anatomy of a Crisis, 8:2 WORLD POL'Y
J. 321, 321-47 (1991).
20. See Weyland, supra note 16.
21. Jeffrey Cason, On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration, 42:1 J. OF
INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 23, 23-42 (2000).
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(seven in total) at solving inflation through the first two governments of
the new democracy involved some element of populist manipulation of
economic policies. The aim in each of the many efforts was to solve infla-
tion with one dramatic, highly intrusive shock coupled with some kind of
progressive or populist element to shield one segment of voters or an-
other.22 One of the last finance ministers of the 1980s, Mafilson da
Nobrega, observed critically that Brazil needed surgery, but successive
finance ministers kept giving the country anesthesia.23
These attempts played a critical and instructive role for both policy
makers and citizens.24 Policy makers came to understand that shocks of
any kind simply were not going to work, both because they did not ad-
dress all the real underlying roots of inflation and because they lacked
credibility in the public mind.25 They came to understand the central im-
portance of government credibility in any effort to contain inflation. On
the other hand, voters had learned to distrust the shock elements of anti-
inflation plans as well as the populist trappings and offerings in which
they had been wrapped. Voters had become deeply intolerant of inflation
but wary of their government's magic promises. 26
By 1993-1994, this learning process prepared the way for a definitive
end to high inflation.27 Cardoso's Real Plan differed in four crucial ways.
First, it addressed all the root causes of inflation. Second, it was debated
openly in Congress and in public and was therefore highly transparent
22. See Bresser-Pereira, supra note 11. As noted earlier, a critical reason for the reli-
ance on shock plans was that the political system fragmented between 1985 and
1989, going from a small handful of political parties to nineteen parties with repre-
sentation in Congress (and over thirty parties competing in the presidential elec-
tion). The difficulty in constructing reliable and durable legislative majorities
encouraged Brazil's presidents to rely on decree authority and dramatic gestures
that did not depend on consistent legislative participation and endorsement.
23. Norman Gall, Fernand Braudel Institute of World Economics, The Floating World
of Brazilian Inflation (1991), available at http://www.normangall.com/publiclist/
artbrazil.htm.
24. Between 1985 and 1990, successive Finance Ministers implemented the Cruzado
Plan, the little Cruzado Plan, the Plan of Rice and Beans, the Summer Plan and, in
what was the most aggressive and invasive plan of all, the Plano Collor. The failure
of the Collor Plan less than 6 months after implementation effectively ended the
possibility that voters would tolerate (or believe in) any future shock plan in
Brazil.
25. Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Economic Reforms and Economic Growth: Efficiency
and Politics in Latin America, in ECONOMIC REFORMS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: A
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC APPROACH (Luiz Carlos Bresser-Periera et al. eds., Cam-
bridge University Press 1993).
26. See Id.; Leslie Armijo, Mass Democracy: The Real Reason that Brazil Ended Infla-
tion?, 33:12 World Dev. 1993, 2013-28 (2005); Leslie Armijo & Philippe Faucher,
We Have a Consensus: Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin
America, 44:2 LATIN AM. POL. & Soc'Y 1, 1-40 (2002).
27. Brazilian inflation was particularly hard to solve because it had both orthodox,
monetarist origins as well as inertial ones. Thus, Brazilian policy makers had to
address excess demand and government spending, but also had to eliminate the
institutionalized memory of inflation in the formal system of price indexation in-
troduced in the 1960s. Previous stabilization efforts, dating back to the military's
use of purely orthodox austerity measures in the 1980s, had generally focused on
one source or the other.
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and thus considerably more credible. Third, it was introduced gradually,
allowing actors time to adjust their expectations and their contracts. The
final difference was the centerpiece of the Real Plan: the creation of a
new unit of value with which to adjust prices and contracts, the URV
(unit of real value), which was anchored loosely to the dollar. The URV
was then converted to a new currency, the real, on July 1, 1994. At the
time the Real Plan was introduced, inflation was over 15 percent per
month. Yet, within three months of introduction, the rate of inflation fell
below 2 percent per month and continued to spiral lower. Riding on the
plan's success and his ability to claim credit for it, Cardoso entered the
1994 presidential elections and swept to victory.28
The plan committed the government to a managed exchanged rate re-
gime in order to maintain the credibility of the currency.29 As a result,
Cardoso's plan, like Collor's before him, depended on a lasting structural
reform that would address the state's underlying sources of fiscal imbal-
ance. Cardoso initiated the Real Plan with a short-term fiscal adjustment
negotiated in Congress, the Social Emergency Fund (in addition to bene-
fiting from Collor's fiscal adjustment efforts and trade liberalization). In
addition, Cardoso launched a negotiated process to recuperate the state's
long-term fiscal capacity in exchange for short-term patronage rewards. 30
In the short to medium term, however, the stability of the real rested on
the credibility of the government's commitment to protect the value of
the currency-in short, to guarantee that there were sufficient reserves to
back the linkage of the currency to the dollar.
To ensure that there were sufficient reserves, the Cardoso government
was forced to adopt a number of measures that preserved
macroeconomic stability, but had other undesirable consequences. These
included renewed privatization to bring in fresh inflows of foreign capital
and a high real interest rate policy to maintain such flows. High real in-
terest rates discouraged investment and led to rising public sector debt.
This, coupled with an overvalued currency (as a consequence of its
linkage to the dollar), hurt agricultural exports, and encouraged imports,
28. Antonio Manuel et al., Elei~do Presidencial: 0 Piano Real na Sucessdo de Itamar
Franco, 2 OPINIA PUBLICA 1, 39-48 (1995). The effect of the Real Plan on voting
was remarkably clear. Lula led in public opinion polls throughout 1994 and was
widely seen as the likely winner of the 1994 elections. He campaigned actively
against the Real Plan, deriding it for its orthodox elements and predicting dire
consequences for the poor, even as it began to take effect in July of 1994. Cardoso,
however, was not able to capitalize on the benefits of the Real Plan until the end
of August, when Brazil's free TV hour for political campaigns began and Cardoso
was able to start claiming credit for the increasingly successful and popular plan.
The polls reversed dramatically through September and October leading to a
crushing victory for Cardoso over the still-critical Lula. The shift in polling and its
coincidence with Cardoso's identification with the plan is tracked clearly in Teix-
era, Manuel and Venturi, 1995.
29. Gesner Oliveira, The Brazilian Economy under the Real: Prospects for Stabiliza-
tion and Growth, Paper Presented to the Latin American Studies Association
(Sept. 28, 1995); Albert Fishlow, Is the Real Plan for Real?, in BRAZIL UNDER
CARDOSO (Susan Kaufman et al. eds.,1997).
30. See Weyland supra note 16.
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which threatened the current account, domestic industry, and the ability
of the government to protect the value of the real.
To cope with the threats to macroeconomic policy, the Cardoso admin-
istration partially reversed course on trade liberalization on three fronts.
First, the administration passed an industrial policy for the auto sector
that significantly raised tariffs on imported vehicles while including a
number of powerful incentives to encourage exports from the sector.
Second, the administration increased tariffs on a number of other impor-
tant sectors and products. Finally, the administration used Mercosur to
increase external common tariffs and provide higher levels of protection
for a host of industrial goods. Mercosur, in fact, provided Brazil with
both a market for an increasing number of industrial exports as well as an
additional layer of protection for its domestic industries and its current
account balance. As a consequence, average tariffs increased substan-
tially between 1995 and 2002, as did the average dispersion among
them.31
The return to selective protectionism did not equate to an embrace of
traditional Brazilian state-led, inward-oriented development. In fact, the
Cardoso administration was divided over the issue of trade and industrial
policy. On one side, advocates of a more neoliberal approach, notably
Finance Minister Pedro Malan, preferred less protectionism and more
limited state intervention in the economy. By contrast, the more nation-
alist "competitive integration" view continued to find its voice in both the
industrial community and within the cabinet, led most notably by the
Minister of Planning, Jos6 Serra. In general terms, Malan and the ne-
oliberal voices were considerably stronger, which showed particularly in
the area of macroeconomic policy. Thus, the Cardoso administration's
industrial policies and use of Mercosur as an additional shield was less a
victory of the Serra wing of the cabinet than it was a recognition of the
risks open trade posed to macroeconomic stability.
But the contradictions of the Real Plan eventually came to a head.
Cardoso made significant efforts to restore the Brazil's long-term fiscal
health, including important changes in transfers to states and local gov-
ernments as well as the creation of a new tax on financial transactions.
These efforts were insufficient, however, to counter concerns about the
government's capacity to maintain the real at rough parity with the dollar.
After a successful defense against a run in October 1998, the administra-
tion lost the battle in January 1999, and the Real Plan ended, as the cur-
rency was sharply devalued and then allowed to float. The ensuing
period leading up to the 2002 elections was one of relatively erratic eco-
nomic performance as the country suffered the consequences of the
shock. Cardoso had put to rest concerns about ungovernability and
drunkenness and set the country on a clear path for the future. But, in
the short term, the path to stability remained a difficult one.
31. See Averbug supra note 5.
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IV. STABILITY, OPENNESS AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE
This increasing economic uncertainty was the context in which the 2002
presidential elections took place. Despite Cardoso's achievements-not
the least of which was the taming of Brazil's historically high rates of
inflation-all of the major presidential candidates ran against his record,
including Cardoso's handpicked successor and former cabinet member,
Josd Serra. Soon into the campaign, Lula emerged as a virtually unassail-
able front-runner. He was running on a platform that explicitly criticized
Cardoso's neoliberalism and called for an "inversion of priorities" to
undo Cardoso's "cursed legacy." The PT platform had changed over the
course of the 1990s from its earlier fairly unapologetic anti-capitalist
stance. Nevertheless, it continued to reflect strong commitments to redis-
tributive policy, social justice, and serious mistrust of global capitalism
(and the United States).
Not surprisingly, both foreign and domestic investors watched the cam-
paign unfold nervously. Over the course of 2002, Brazil's risk premium
rose in response to growing concerns about the possibility of default on
the debt and the real devalued by roughly 50 percent. Cardoso's second
term saw deteriorating fiscal and current accounts, sharply rising public
sector debt, rising real interest rates (over 20 percent), and rising inflation
(though still very low by Brazil's historical standards). Though unem-
ployment was the number one concern among voters, the growing
macroeconomic uncertainty led to a sharp increase in voter concern re-
garding resurgent inflation.32 Lula's stated priorities suggested that his
administration would make little effort to protect the macroeconomic sta-
bility that had been the chief priority of the Cardoso administration. 33
To counter the growing concern about the possibility of his electoral
victory, Lula issued a public "Letter to the Brazilian People" in June of
2002. 34 The letter reaffirmed his criticisms of the Cardoso administration
and his commitment to social justice. But it also acknowledged the risks
of resurgent inflation and the need to meet existing debt obligations.
Thus, the letter's audience was both domestic voters and foreign and Bra-
zilian investors. Lula needed to give notice to voters that his administra-
tion would have to put the "inversion of priorities" agenda on hold in the
interest of guarding against inflation. He also needed to credibly signal
his commitment to macroeconomic stability to Wall Street and Avenida
Paulista.
This shift in Lula's priorities reflected his political learning over the
32. Rachel Meneguello, Government Popularity and Public Reaction to Social Security
Reforms, 17 INT'L. J. OF PuB. OPINION RES. 1, 173-189 (2005).
33. Aline Diniz and Jonathan Kreickhaus, The Limits of Economic Reform in Brazil,
in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL REVISITED (Peter Kingstone & Timothy Power eds., Uni-
versity of Pittsburg Press forthcoming Oct. 2008).
34. Letter from Luis Inicio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, to the Brazilian people
(2002). available at http://www.pt.org.br.
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course of the 1990s. 35 Lula had run for president in every presidential
election since the restoration of democracy in 1985. In each election, a
right wing (Collor, 1989) or center (Cardoso, 1994 and 1998) candidate
defeated him on the backs of poor voters. Lula, a working class hero and
son of very poor northeastern migrants to Sgo Paulo, was more popular
among middle class and educated voters, as well as the organized working
class (both white and blue collar), than he was among the voters that
should have been his natural base. One crucial reason for this outcome
was his and the PT's failure to understand the importance of inflation to
low income voters. In fact, in 1994, Lula actively campaigned against the
Real Plan as a neoliberal program that would reduce the purchasing
power of the poor by 30 percent. Instead, the plan's success at reducing
inflation provided one of the fastest and most effective reductions of the
rate of poverty in modern Brazilian history. Inverting priorities and so-
cial justice resonated well among the social movements and the organized
labor base of the PT, but low inflation mattered to low-income voters. 36
As a result, Lula moved to strongly signal his commitment to fiscal
discipline and macroeconomic stability. With the failure of the Real Plan,
macroeconomic management shifted from exchange rate control to ex-
plicit inflation targeting.37 Lula preserved this orthodox macroeconomic
orientation and went further to signal his commitment to orthodoxy by
appointing two well known, highly regarded market-oriented figures to
key positions: Henrique Meirelles as President of the Central Bank and
Antonio Palocci as Finance Minister. He publicly announced a primary
surplus target of 4.5 percent of GDP, which considerably exceeded even
the IMF's suggested target. Finally, he embraced a set of economic and
social reforms designed to improve the fiscal health of the state, even
though they also harmed core constituencies of his own party. The most
important of these was a reform of the pension system for public sector
employees-a policy attempted under Cardoso (with meager success)
and one that the PT had fought against bitterly. In fact, the pension re-
form was so controversial that four members of the PT party were ex-
pelled after voting against it in the Congress, and more members left PT
35. Wendy Hunter, The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers' Party in Brazil,
59:3 WORLD POL. 341, 440-475 (2007); Hunter, 2007, notes that PT party leaders
were influenced both by the 1994 defeat and by Cardoso's crushing 1998 first
round victory. The lessons to the party leadership were clear about the need to be
pragmatic and forego radical reform in favor of protecting macroeconomic stabil-
ity. Barbosa-Filho, the Secretary for Economic Monitoring in the Ministry of Fi-
nance under Lula, also notes that the government's central objective was rapid
disinflation and continued inflation-targeting against its potential recurrence.
36. Note that this does not mean that inflation was in fact the key factor in presidential
elections-although it does appear to have been definitive for 1994-or that infla-
tion is an accurate predictor of voting behavior. The claim of the importance of
inflation does not rest on tests of economic voting across the various elections.
What does matter is that PT leaders believed that inflation and managing the
macro economy were tremendously important to low-income voters and as a con-
sequence shifted their policy orientation and political strategy.
37. Nelson Barbosa-Filho, Inflation targeting in Brazil: 1999-2006, 22:2 INTL. REV. AP-
PLIED ECON. 187 (2008).
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of their own volition in anger.38
Since 2002, Lula's commitment to macroeconomic stability has only
deepened, even after containing the immediate crisis of 2002. In fact,
Lula reaped rapid economic rewards for his orthodox policies. Growth,
per capita growth, and inflation all looked bad in 2003, but by 2004, the
economy was improving dramatically. GDP growth increased from
roughly 1 percent in 2003 to over 5 percent in 2004, while GDP per capita
growth increased from negative .25 percent to over 4 percent. Inflation
fell from over 14 percent to under 7 percent. In addition, the value of the
real not only recovered but also appreciated against the U.S. dollar, while
both the current and fiscal accounts improved significantly. The perform-
ance of the Brazilian economy looked particularly good in comparison to
the Cardoso period (see Table 1).
Strong economic performance has reinforced Lula's commitment to
macroeconomic stability, and his administration continues to rely on in-
flation targeting as its central macroeconomic policy tool-something
that has cost Lula's party the support of its traditional base. Social move-
ments, which had long constituted the party's organizational compensa-
tion for more limited financing, have withdrawn support. Brazil's
Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST) and the public sector unions
have withdrawn their automatic allegiance. 39 To counter these develop-
ments, Lula cultivated and received support from the biggest benefi-
ciaries of macroeconomic stability: low-income and low-education voters
of the north and northeast.40 This group became Lula's key electoral
base in the 2006 presidential election, constituting a dramatic shift away
from his 2002 base in the organized working class and middle class of the
south and southeast voters.
But Lula's rewards came from good fortune as well as sound
macroeconomic policy. The global economy had begun growing much
faster after 2003, fueled by demand from India and especially China. In
addition, Lula was a beneficiary of the end of the Real Plan, as evidenced
by the devalued currency and the floating exchange rate regime leading
to sharp improvements in Brazil's trade performance. Trade as a percent
of GDP increased every year after the 1999 shock, from around 15 per-
cent in 1998 to a high of 29 percent in 2004 (and then falling slightly to an
38. Peter Kingstone & Aldo Ponce, The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin
America: From Cardoso to Lula: The Triumph of Pragmatic Neoliberalism in Bra-
zil, Paper Presented at the Theresa Lonzano Long Institute of Latin American
Studies at the University of Texas, Austin: (Mar. 6-7, 2008).
39. Kathryn Hochstetler, Organized Civil Society in Lula's Brazil, in DEMOCRATIC
BRAZIL REVISITED (Peter Kingstone & Timothy Power eds., University of Pitts-
burg Press forthcoming Oct. 2008).
40. Wendy Hunter & Timothy J. Power, Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Pol-
icy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006, 49:1 LATIN AM. POL. & Soc'Y 1 (2006);
Lourdes Sola, Politics, Markets and Society in Lula's Brazil, 19:2 J. OF DEMOC-
RACY 5, 31-45 (2008).
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average of roughly 27 percent in the years since). 41 Brazilian trade has
increased dramatically in all categories of trade, including basics, semi-
manufactured, and manufactured goods. Brazil's performance on trade
has been a critical element in the country's macroeconomic stability, as
evidenced by historic current account deficits turning into large surpluses.
In turn, these surpluses have allowed Brazil to progressively retire its for-
eign, dollar-denominated debt. As of 2008, Brazil still has considerable
net public sector debt, but its foreign debt has been retired completely.
Trade policy under Lula, as with Cardoso, has become an important
element in the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. Under Cardoso,
a partial and selective retreat from liberalization while promoting exports
(both industrial and agricultural) was a critical protection against the high
real interest rates and overvalued currency that, at the time, was the bed-
rock of macroeconomic performance. Cardoso's cabinet was divided on
the nationalist-liberal question, with the liberal side generally being dom-
inant, selective protectionism notwithstanding.
Lula's cabinet also reflected similar tensions. Nationalist and statist
ideas still exist in Brazil, and, generally Lula's foreign policy has had a
decidedly nationalist orientation.42 Under Lula, the nationalist economic
perspective was championed by Jos6 Dirceu, while the Finance Minister,
Palocci, played the role of defender of liberal policies. Again, like
Cardoso, the liberal wing of Lula's administration has dominated on eco-
nomic matters, especially since Dirceu's political fall in the corruption
scandals of 2005-2006.
In general terms, the approach towards trade has been similar between
the Cardoso and the Lula administrations, as evidenced by much greater
trade liberalization than in the past, with selective protection for key in-
dustrial sectors. Trade has become a critical element of Brazilian eco-
nomic performance and a central part of macroeconomic stability. For
those reasons, neither Cardoso nor Lula was particularly eager to negoti-
ate the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA). The FTAA
promised greater integration with the U.S. market, without promising lib-
41. Minist6rio de Desenvolvimento, Indfistria, e Comdrcio Exterior, http://www.mdic.
gov.br (last visited March, 2008).
42. See Soares de Lima, supra note 4. Soares de Lima and Hirst distinguish between
one side that seeks greater international credibility and another that seeks greater
autonomy. The credibility seekers look to work within existing institutions, creat-
ing new rules, accepting Brazil's power limits, and seeking to maintain orthodox
macroeconomic commitments. By contrast, the autonomy seekers look to create
new institutions, enhance Brazil's autonomy and prestige, integrate development
goals with foreign policy, and challenge US influence in the region. For Soares de
Lima and Hirst, the macroeconomic orientation looks very much the same be-
tween Cardoso and Lula, but they argue that the autonomy side has prevailed
under Lula and thus explains the vigorousness of Lula's "South-South" strategy.
They have a broad focus on foreign policy across a number of domains, while mine
is limited to macroeconomics and trade. In the more limited sense that I focus on,
I believe the economic policy orientation continues to reflect a pragmatic liberal
dominance despite the significant shift towards a "South-South" strategy analyzed
by Soares de Lima and Hirst.
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eralized access for key agricultural products, while simultaneously de-
manding greater access in industrial sectors and services. In short, the
FTAA, as presented to Brazil, posed a potential threat to Brazil's current
accounts coupled with the possibility of real losses in critical industrial
sectors.
4 3
Under Cardoso, international conditions were difficult and the admin-
istration felt pressure to proceed cautiously with the FTAA negotiations,
generally preferring multilateral arrangements and bargaining between
blocs. In particular, the administration did not want the United States to
selectively pull Brazil's regional partners away from existing regional
blocs such as Mercosur, whose member countries constituted a growing
market for Brazilian exporters. With both the real and the peso similarly
overvalued, the exchange rate did not affect Brazilian exports, and trade
within Mercosur increased considerably over the 1990s, growing to more
than 20 percent of Brazilian trade. Yet, the collapse of the Real Plan in
1999 destabilized the trading relationship with Argentina (with trade fall-
ing to roughly 10 percent of total trade), and the growing economic crisis
in both countries, coupled with the generally weak institutional frame-
work of Mercosur, made it a weak reed to stand on as an alternative to
the FTAA.44
Conditions for Lula have been quite different. With global growth and
trade expanding in the 2000s, the whole region has been growing.
Mercosur has expanded to include Venezuela, Chile, and Bolivia as asso-
ciate members, and trade within the region has boomed (although the
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) continues to represent
only about 11 percent of trade, with Argentina accounting for most of it).
In addition, trade with India and, especially, China has provided Brazil
with new markets for its goods.45 Furthermore, Lula has traveled abroad
frequently seeking new commercial ties in other developing regions, such
as Africa and the Middle East. In short, the expansion of global trade has
made a "South-South" strategy an attractive option to both the FTAA
and acquiescence to U.S. and European preferences in the WTO. The
Brazil-led G-20 (the developing nation negotiating bloc) has been able to
stand as a front against OECD preferences for increased access to South-
ern markets without reciprocal easing of restrictions on agricultural
trade.4 6
43. Jeffrey Hornbeck, Brazilian Trade Policy and the United States, Congressional Re-
search Service (Feb. 3, 2006), available at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/
permalink/meta-crs-9138; Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, The FTAA and the Political
Economy of Protection in Brazil and the US, Institute for the Integration of Latin
America and the Caribbean & Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Divi-
sion, Working Paper-SITI- 12, Mar. 2006).
44. Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur and the End Game of the FTAA Negotiations: Chal-
lenges and Prospects after the Argentine Crisis, 25:2 Third World Q. 277, 319-327
(2004).
45. Fernando Pimentel Puga, Brazilian Development Bank, A Inserq~o do Brasil no
comdrcio mundial: o efeito China e potenciais e especializaqao das exportaq6es
(2005), http:l/www.bndes.gov.br/conhecimento/publicaq6es/catalogo/td.asp.
46. See Soares de Lima, supra note 4.
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While the "South-South" strategy has been available to Lula, it is not
clear how effective it has been for Brazil. The Lula administration has
tried to use these various options as increased leverage against the United
States in particular, with limited impact ultimately. This is because the
United States and the European Union remain vital markets for Brazilian
exports, with total trade between Brazil and those entities significantly
exceeding trade with Mercosur (or ALADI, more broadly). In addition,
ongoing Argentine-Brazil trade tensions have continued to limit
Mercosur's deepening as a common market, and thus, Mercosur contin-
ues to represent a weak reed for bloc bargaining. Nor has Brazil suc-
ceeded in leveraging greater access to the European Union and reducing
its considerable protection of agriculture. Finally, as recent negotiation
failures in the Doha Round demonstrate, even the G-20 has had limited
capacity to alter U.S. and European agricultural protectionist policies.
Although Brazil's regional and "South-South" strategy has had limited
success, Lula's selective liberal trading policy has not only been good for
growth and macroeconomic performance-it has also been good politics.
Public opinion polls show that Brazilians are relatively supportive of free
trade and correctly identify it with lower prices for consumer goods. 47
Nevertheless, anti-U.S. sentiment and resistance to imperialism feed into
"auto-estima" (self-esteem) feelings prevalent within Brazil (including
among elite policy-makers), and the FTAA is widely unpopular among
the general public for its perceived unfairness. 48 As a result, Lula pays a
small price, politically or economically, for his reluctance to pursue uni-
lateral liberalization or deeper integration with the United States through
the FTAA. As long as these basic political and economic conditions pre-
vail, Brazilian presidents face very weak incentives to change this stance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Brazil has changed enormously since the 1980s. The country's political
and policy-making elite has come to a relatively consensual embrace of
pragmatic neoliberalism, a deep commitment to sound macroeconomic
policies, and an acceptance of open trade as a real benefit to Brazil. This
is a dramatic and impressive change. But it is also one that presents clear
limits to the possibility of further trade integration with the United
States.
This does not mean that Brazil could not benefit from reviewing these
policies. Lula's Brazil has benefited from his commitment to
macroeconomic stability, but he has also benefited from a particularly
auspicious global context (unlike his predecessor, Cardoso). Brazilian
politicians can maintain their policy commitment, but they continue to
face challenges to that commitment and obstacles to long-term, sustaina-
47. Andy Baker, Consuming the Washington Consensus: Mass Reponses to the Mar-
ket in Latin America (Cambridge University Press forthcoming).
48. Sean W. Burges, Auto-estima in Brazil: The Logic of Lula's South-South Policy,
60:4 INT'L J. 897, 1133-1151 (2005).
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ble growth. Perhaps more importantly, the global good times are cer-
tainly not going to last. When they do come to a close, Brazilian
competitiveness, both domestically and in global markets, will matter
much more.
The problem for Brazil is that macroeconomic stability continues to
depend on high real interest rates that attract capital as an offset to en-
during structural impediments to fiscal health. In particular, the coun-
try's grossly inequitable and bloated public sector pension system is a
significant drain on the treasury. Although interest rates have come
down from the highs of the late 1990s, they are still uncompetitive and
constitute a drag on economic growth and domestic investment. High
real interest rates, in turn, help maintain an uncompetitive exchange rate,
despite real improvements on that front since the late 1990s. The com-
petitiveness of the economy also suffers from labor market rigidities,
which have been and will continue to be very difficult to reform, and an
inefficient, burdensome tax system that falls too heavily on production in
the formal sector of the economy, which is another difficult area to re-
form due to the state's reliance on the revenues from these taxes. Yet,
both of these circumstances drag on the performance of the economy. In
fact, Brazil's performance under Lula looks excellent when compared to
Brazil's past economic performance. But the cluster of factors noted
above has hurt Brazilian economic performance in relation to the rest of
the region. Compared to Argentina, Peru, or Chile, for example, Brazil's
performance looks sluggish.
The problem has been, and continues to be, the subordination of
microeconomic concerns to macroeconomic ones. As Gesner Oliveira
observed, the constant privileging of macroeconomic concerns leads to
contradictions in the micro-economy that translate into uncompetitive
consequences. 49 The same observation could be extended to trade policy.
Brazil has legitimate concerns about trade and the FI[AA. It is not un-
reasonable to expect that the OECD markets will reciprocate on key ag-
ricultural sectors. But trade as a tool of macroeconomic policy has meant
it is sub-optimal as a tool to support and promote increased
microeconomic competitiveness. Even in agriculture, where liberaliza-
tion has been greater and has existed longer than in industry, perform-
ance has been lower than expected with critical sectors like coffee
underperforming.5 0 Thus, in the final analysis, Brazil's policy elites are
split between a liberal group that favors open trade as part of a larger
vision of economic development and those that envision selective open-
ing of trade as part of an industrial policy approach to development. Ulti-
mately, neither has prevailed as macroeconomic concerns have driven
49. GESNER OLIVEIRA, CONDICIONANTES E DIRETRIZES DE POLITICA PARA A ABER-
TURA COMERCIAL BRASILEIRA (IPEA Research Project, CEBRAP, Sao Paulo,
Brazil 1991).
50. Steven M. Helfand & Gervisio Castro de Rezende, The Impact of Sector-Specific
and Economy-Wide Policy Reforms on the Agricultural Sector in Brazil: 1980-1998,
22:2 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 1, 194-212 (2004).
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trade policy choices. Unfortunately, the long-term competitiveness of the
domestic economy ends up paying the price.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Armijo, Leslie. 2005. "Mass Democracy: The Real Reason that Brazil
Ended Inflation?" World Development, 33:12, December, pp. 2013-2028
Armijo, Leslie and Philippe Faucher. 2002. "'We Have a Consensus':
Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin America,"
Latin American Politics and Society, 44:2, pp. 1-40.
Averbug, Andr& "Brazilian Trade Integration in the 1990s." http://
www.bndes.gov.br/english/studies.asp. Accessed 3/5/08.
Baer, Werner. 1995. The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Develop-
ment. New York:Praeger.
Baker, Andy. Forthcoming. Consuming the Washington Consensus:
Mass Responses to the Market in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e Social (BNDES),
1989a. "Integraqo Competitiva: Uma Estrategia para o Desenvolvi-
mento Brasileiro." Area de Planejamento. November.
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e Social (BNDES),
1989b. "Integraqo Competitiva: Uma Nova Estrat6gia para a Industrial-
izaqdo Brasileira." Paper presented by Luiz Paulo Vellozo Lucas, Chief
of the Planning Department at the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization Technical Meeting, Vienna, April 4-7.
Barbosa-Filho, Nelson. 2008. "Inflation Targeting in Brazil, 1999-
2006." 22:2 INTL. REv. APPLIED ECON. 187.
Barbosa-Filho, Nelson. 2008. "An Unusual Economic Arrangement:
The Brazilian Economy During the First Lula Administration." Interna-
tional Journal of Politics, Culture and Society. 19:3, p. 193-215.
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos. 1993. "Economic Reforms and Eco-
nomic Growth: Efficiency and Politics in Latin America." In Luiz Carlos
Bresser Pereira, Jos6 Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Re-
forms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos. 1991. "Populism and Economic Policy in
Brazil." Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs. 33 (Summer): 1-21.
Bresser-Pereira, Luis Carlos. 1978. 0 Colapso de um Alianga de Clas-
ses. Sio Paulo: Brasiliense.
Burges, Sean W. 2005. "Auto-estima in Brazil: the Logic of Lula's
South-South Policy." International Journal, 60 (Autumn), pp. 1133-1151.
Carranza, Mario E. "Mercosur and the End Game of the FTAA Nego-
tiations: Challenges and Prospects after the Argentine Crisis." Third
World Quarterly, 25:2, pp. 319-327.
SOBERING UP AND GOING GLOBAL
Cason, Jeffrey. 2000. "On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Inte-
gration." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42:1, pp. 23-
42.
Diniz, Aline, ERROR! REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND. and Jonathan
Krieckhaus. 2008. "The Limits of Economic Reform in Brazil." In Peter
Kingstone and Timothy Power, eds. Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Fishlow, Albert. 1997. "Is the Real Plan for Real?" In Susan Kauf-
man Purcell and Riordan Roett, eds. Brazil Under Cardoso. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Frieden, Jeffry. (1991). Debt, development, and democracy modern po-
litical economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Gall, Norman. 1991. "The Floating World of Brazilian Inflation." In-
stituto Fernand Braudel, Sdo Paulo, Brazil, September.
Helfand, Steven M. and Gervisio Castro de Rezende. "The Impact of
Sector-Specific and Economy-Wide Policy Reforms on the Agricultural
Sector in Brazil: 1980-1998." Contemporary Economic Policy, 22:2, pp.
194-212.
Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2008. "Organized Civil Society in Lula's Bra-
zil." In Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power, eds. Democratic Brazil Re-
visited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Hornbeck, Jeff. 2006. "Brazilian Trade Policy and the United States."
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, February 3rd.
Hunter, Wendy. 2008. "The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Left
Party?" In Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power, eds. Democratic Brazil
Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Hunter, Wendy. 2007. "The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Work-
ers' Party in Brazil." World Politics, 59:3, pp. 440-475.
Hunter, Wendy and Timothy J. Power. 2006. "Rewarding Lula: Execu-
tive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006." Latin
American Politics and Society, 49:1, Spring.
Kingstone, Peter. 1999. Crafting Coalitions for Reform. College Park:
Penn State Press.
Kingstone, Peter and Aldo Ponce. 2008. "From Cardoso to Lula: The
Triumph of Pragmatic Neoliberalism in Brazil." Paper presented at the
conference on "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin
America: What does the Left Do Right? University of Texas, Austin,
March 6-7, 2008.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave
of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Meneguello, Rachel. 2005. "Government Popularity and Public Reac-
tion to Social Security Reforms." International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 17:2, pp 173-189.
2009]
126 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
Minist6rio de Desenvolvimento, Indilstria, e Com6rcio Exterior. Sta-
tistics, http://www.mdic.gov.br. Accessed March 2008.
Montero, Alfred. "Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization
and the New Brazilian Federalism." In Peter Kingstone and Timothy
Power, eds. Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions and Processes. Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press 2000.
Oliveira, Gesner. 1995. "The Brazilian Economy under the Real:
Prospects for Stabilization and Growth." Paper presented at the Latin
American Studies Association, Washington, DC, September 28-30.
Oliveira, Gesner. 1991. "Condicionantes e Diretrizes de Polftica para a
Abertura Comercial Brasileira." IPEA Research Project, CEBRAP.
Sdo Paulo: February.
Paiva Abreu, Marcelo de. 2005. "The F[AA and the Political Econ-
omy of Protection in Brazil and the US." Texto para Discussdo, No. 494
(January). Departamento de Econ6mia, PUC-Rio. Pimentel Puga, Fer-
nando. 2005. "A Inserqdo do Brasil no com6rcio mundial: o efeito China
e potenciais e especializaqdo das exportaq6es." http://www.bndes.gov.br/
conhecimento/publicagces/catalogo/td.asp. Accessed 3/1/2008.
Power, Timothy J. 2008. "Centering Democracy? Ideological Cleav-
ages and Convergence in the Brazilian Political Class." In Peter King-
stone and Timothy Power, eds. Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Schneider, Ben Ross 1991. "Brazil Under Collor: Anatomy of a Cri-
sis," World Policy Journal 8, no.2, Spring, pp. 321-47.
Silva, Luis Inicio Lula da. (2002). Letter to the Brazilian people. Availa-
ble at http://www.pt.org.br
Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Monica Hirst. 2006. "Brazil as an
Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice, and Responsi-
bilities." International Affairs, 82:1, pp. 21-40.
Sola, Lourdes, 2008. "Politics, Markets and Society in Lula's Brazil."
Journal of Democracy. 19:2, pp. 31-45.
Sola, Lourdes. 1988. "Heterodox Shock in Brazil: T6cnicos, Politi-
cians, and Democracy." Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 23:163-
95.
Teixera, Mendes, Antonio Manuel, and Gustavo Venturi. 1995. "Elei-
qdo Presidencial: 0 Plano Real na SucessAo de Itamar Franco." Opinido
Ptiblica 2, no. 2: 39-48.
Weyland, Kurt. 1998. "The Brazilian State in the New Democracy."
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Winter, 1997-1998.
